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ABSTRACT
On 1 January 1993 the European Union (EU) formed the world’s 
largest single unified market consisting of some 350 million 
consumers. Since this time additional Western European 
countries have become members of the EU, with the prospects of 
expanded membership to include other wealthy Western 
European nations. However, this paper attempts to analyse the 
prospects of expanded EU membership from the ranks of the 
former Eastern bloc states, which have, since the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, been attempting to transform their economies from 
the communist era of central planning to that of market 
economies.
The likelihood of such membership from the former Comecon 
group of nations in the foreseeable future, is most realistically 
limited to those from Central Europe—Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. All of these have already applied 
for such membership. In the process of striving for EU 
membership, which is regarded by each nation as being both 
economically and politically desirable, instead of having adopted 
a group, or cooperative, approach, each have adopted an 
individualistic approach involving a reorientation of their trade 
away from each other to the EU and active competition for hard 
currency exports and for foreign direct investment.
The paper is primarily concerned with identifying the recent 
macroeconomic performance of three of these Central European 
economies—Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland identifying 
some of the major reform measures which have been 
implemented as well as some of the major difficulties which each 
of them is currently experiencing. The major issues and 
stumbling blocks which exist to their membership of the EU are 
also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent best seller written by Lester Thurow,1 he predicted that 
the economic battle of the twenty first century between the three 
economic superpowers — Japan, USA and Europe — would be 
won by Europe with Germany at its hub. However, such a 
prediction was based upon the premise that Europe — both 
West, Central and East would be able to unite to form a single 
unified market, incorporating Russia, consisting of some 800 
million consumers. On 1 January, within the confines of Western 
Europe, the European Union took a major step in this direction by 
foixning the world's largest single unified market consisting of 
some 350 million consumers. Since this time additional countries 
have become members of the EU (as of 1 January 1995 — Austria, 
Finland and Sweden), with the prospects of expanded 
membership to include Switzerland and perhaps Norway in the 
reasonably near future and Turkey somewhat further down the 
track. However, of some interest is the prospect that EU 
membership will be expanded from the ranks of the former 
Eastern bloc states, which, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
are transforming their economies from being centrally planned to 
market driven.
The likelihood of such membership in the foreseeable future 
from the former Comecon2 group of nations, is most realistically 
limited to five of these from Central Europe — Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The remaining nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe are experiencing major economic 
dislocations in their transition processes, or from the ravages of
1 L. Thurow (1992), Head to Head, Allen & Unwin.
2 Of course the reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 resulted in the 
former Comecon country of East Germany now having become incorporated 
in the EU.
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war, and are in much too weak an economic position to be 
realistically considered for membership in the foreseeable future. 
In 1991 four of these Central European economies met in 
Visegrad, Hungary, after the demise of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) in January of that year, to identify 
what their options were for the future. However the "Visegrad 
group" as they became known, and the resulting Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), has become largely 
irrelevant, with members instead reorientating their trade away 
from each other and actively competing3 for hard currency 
exports to the EU and for foreign direct investment. Such an 
individualistic, rather than cooperative, approach by these 
nations may also be a reflection of their belief that in doing so 
their individual prospects for joining the EU is likely to be 
enhanced.
All of these Central European nations have applied for 
membership of the EU, and an important issue arises as to the 
timing of such membership. Their are diverging viewpoints over 
this. The Hungarian position is that membership of the EU should 
be based on merit and should not be on a group basis, whilst the 
Poles take the position that the group should take a more 
cooperative stance and join the EU at the same time. Although in 
the latter case the reality is very different.
The remainder of this paper considers some of the major 
reform measures which have been conducted in the Central 
European economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
in particular, as well as some of the major difficulties which each 
of them is currently experiencing in their transition process. Their 
recent macroeconomic performance during this transition to a 
market economy is also considered. In addition, some of the
3 Or in the case of the former countries of the Czech and Slovak Republic 
(CSFR), the Czech Republic and Slovakia, actively squabbling with each 
other after their agreed separation on 1 January 1993.
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major issues and stumbling blocks which exist to their 
membership of the EU are also discussed. Finally a summary of 
the major conclusions from this paper is presented.
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE THREE ECONOMIES
This section focuses upon the major reform measures which have 
been implemented in the three countries under review, in the 
process of transforming from centrally planned to market 
economies during the 1990s. The situation for each country is now 
discussed in turn.
Czech Republic
During its transition process to date, there have been two major 
areas towards which economic reform has been directed:
i. Monetary policy and financial sector reform
ii. Fiscal policy and reforms
i. M onetary policy and financial sector reform
Since the introduction of reforms in early 1991, monetary policy 
has played a key role in the financial stabilisation of the economy. 
Its successful implementation is reflected in the reduction of 
inflation, the stability of the nominal exchange rate and the 
strengthening of the external reserves position. However its 
implementation has been difficult due to the short period of time 
since the introduction of the reforms, and the change in underlying 
behavioural relationships which have made the formulation of an 
appropriate policy stance even more difficult. The economy's 
fixed exchange rate regime, strong capital inflows, which have 
been the sole source of increase in reserve money since mid 1993,
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have additionally exerted pressure on the central bank in the 
conduct of monetary policy.
However Czech policy makers have made considerable 
progress in developing indirect instruments of monetary control. 
With the removal of direct ceilings on commercial bank credits by 
October 1992, the primary focus of monetary control shifted to 
auctions of refinance credit and adjustments in minimum reserve 
requirements. Since mid 1993, the use of refinance credit auctions 
has been minimal and, with growing capital inflows, open market 
operations have become increasingly important. From 1994 the 
system of monetary management has been based on open market 
operations, changes in reserve requirements and adjustments of 
the discount rate.
The establishment of a sound commercial banking sector was 
emphasised in the transition program of the former Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) during 1991-92, and later in the 
newly formed Czech Republic. Such efforts have included the 
introduction of a more effective banking regulation and 
supervisory regime, the establishment of an efficient payments 
system and strengthening the balance sheets of the commercial 
banks through a combination of both centralised and 
decentralised approaches. The centralised operations were aimed 
at non performing loans inherited from the days of central 
planning or incurred on behalf of the state. The measures have 
included transfers of debt out of individual banks, exchanging 
poor quality debt for official assets and providing capital 
infusion. The decentralised approach requires banks to bear major 
responsibility in accumulating loan-loss provisions and building 
up their capital base. To facilitate this task the government has 
given limited tax incentives for loan-loss provisions and issued 
risk classification guidelines and regulations covering credit 
exposures and capital adequacy. To minimise the moral hazard 
issues associated with the balance sheet restructuring operations
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and to strengthen corporate governance of banks, all the large 
formerly state owned banks, with the exception of the foreign 
trade banks, were privatised in the first wave of voucher 
privatisation.
To foster competition, a liberal approach was taken to the 
entry of new private banks. Forty seven new banks have emerged 
since the beginning of the reform process, about one-half with 
partial or full participation.
ii. Fiscal policy and reforms
The objective of fiscal policy has been twofold: to reduce the role 
of the state in the economy, and secondly to assist in the 
stabilisation of the economy. With the first objective in mind, the 
government has implemented the following measures:
• cut subsidies in 1991 and kept the level unchanged in 
nominal terms thereafter,
• reformed corporate income taxation. In 1991, the rates 
of tax on profits were reduced by 10-20 percentage 
points and the rate structure was simplified. In 1993 a 
single 45% profits tax replaced three earlier business 
taxes. The rate was lowered to 42% in 1994,
• introduced further tax reform in 1993, including the 
introduction of a Value Added Tax (VAT) (at rates of 
zero, 5 and 23 %) and reform of the income tax (both 
personal and corporate) and social security systems. A 
personal income tax on a progressive scale was 
introduced to replace the previous patchwork of taxes 
on the wages of large enterprises and various other 
forms of income. For social security, the old payroll tax 
of differential rates was replaced by a system where 
both the employer and the employee contributed. The
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effect of the tax reforms of 1993 was to shift the tax 
burden from corporate incomes onto wage incomes.
On the expenditure side, a number of social safety net 
programs were introduced in 1990. These included unemployment 
insurance, support for families in poverty and the long term 
unemployed, and cash payments to households as compensation 
for price liberalisation. In 1994 aid programs for low income 
tenants and matching subsidies of voluntary, supplemental 
pension contributions in private plans were introduced. Outwith 
these changes the entitlement system, especially pensions and 
family allowances, continued to be as before under central 
planning.
From 1994 the government formulated its budget within the 
framework of a medium term strategy to achieve the following 
objectives: reduce the expenditure to GDP ratio gradually to 40- 
42 % by the year 2000, reduce the tax burden to levels prevailing 
in industrial countries, and stabilise the nominal level of public 
debt. To achieve the latter, a balanced budget every year was the 
objective.
The Czech transformation has now entered a new stage. The 
major tasks in this new stage are to consolidate the gains of 
stabilisation, and to focus upon the restructuring of enterprises. 
The recent recovery of output and strong export performance (as 
discussed in the following section) as well as strong capital 
inflows in the form of enterprise borrowing abroad, suggest that 
some parts of the industrial sector are making the necessary 
structural adjustments. However increasing non performing loans 
in the portfolio of domestic banks suggests that others are 
continuing to struggle through the transformation process.
It is unlikely that the desired transformation of the economy 
can be achieved without substantial enterprise closures. Rigidities 
and distortions that are still built into the economy will also need
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to be eliminated. Unless measures are urgently taken to improve 
labour mobility from areas of surplus labour to places where new 
jobs are being created, not only is it likely that regional 
unemployment from firm closures will be high but economic 
growth will be stifled. A chronic shortage of housing currently 
constrains such labour mobility.
Hungary
With the end of the socialist era in 1990, Hungary faced many 
economic and social challenges. Beginning with the New Economic 
Mechanism in 1968, efforts had been made to adapt the system 
of central planning to increase its responsiveness to the needs of 
producers and consumers. However major changes were still 
required in order to enable the economy to operate in such a way 
as to be consistent with that of a market economy by 1990, 
including changes in enterprise structure and governance and in 
labour and capital markets. Although there had been previous 
reforms in the areas of trade and price liberalisation, and those 
relating to the budget, tax policy, and the banking system, they 
needed to be further extended and refined.
The newly elected incoming government devised a broad based 
four year plan for structural and macroeconomic reforms during 
its first year in office. The so called Kupa program, named after 
the Minister of Finance, spelled out a detailed plan specifying the 
problems to be addressed, the intended goals, the necessary tasks 
of the government, the forms of remedy (laws, regulations, 
creation of new institutions), their scheduled dates of enactment 
or creation and the relevant government institutions responsible.
Success with structural reforms has been uneven however. 
Whilst considerable progress with respect to price and trade 
liberalisation has been achieved, enabling the Hungarian economy 
to achieve a relatively liberal system, progress has proven more
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difficult in many areas of fiscal reform, as well as enterprise and 
banking restructuring. The state still plays a major role within the 
economy, including its redistributive function which has 
contributed to high marginal tax rates. This has hampered 
economic activity, and contributed to adverse macroeconomic 
developments in the budget deficit, current account deficit and 
the uncomfortably high foreign debt.
The major areas of economic reform have been as follows:
Price liberalisation
The price system had been liberalised in stages since the 
introduction of reforms under the New Economic Mechanism. By 
1989, only 17% of consumer prices remained officially determined 
with the remainder freely determined. The share of free consumer 
prices was increased to 89% in 1991, 92% in 1992 and 94% in
1993. Government determined prices remained only for electric 
energy, public transport and pharmaceuticals. In 1991, the Price 
Office, which was responsible for controlling prices, was 
eliminated.
Trade liberalisation
The new government was the leading international advocate of 
dismantling the CMEA trading system. This dismantling occurred 
in 1991, and thereafter almost all transactions were conducted at 
world prices and in convertible currencies. The objective of the 
new government was instead to focus the country's trade policy 
with that of EU members, and in early 1992 an Association 
Agreement was adopted with the EU outlining a timetable for the 
dismantling of trade barriers. In addition the Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) comprising Hungary itself, 
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and subsequently
Slovenia, was adopted, including a timetable for a free trade area 
among the partner countries. At the beginning of 1995, further 
trade liberalisation was implemented under agreements with the 
EU, CEFTA and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as 
well as under the Uruquay Round. By as early as 1990, about 
90% of total imports were already free of quantitative or value 
limitations
Fiscal reforms
The fiscal reform program included an ambitious strategy to 
modify the budgetary sector to make it consistent with a market 
economy. This included further reforming the tax system, reducing 
the scope and scale of fiscal activities and increasing the 
efficiency of remaining activities. While partial, but significant, 
progress was made in regard to achieving the first objective, the 
other two objectives were essentially not achieved.
In regard to tax reforms the government's intention was to 
broaden the direct tax bases by reducing and eliminating large 
numbers of tax reliefs and exemptions granted under enterprise 
profit and personal income taxation. In addition, it intended to 
introduce realistic depreciation rates and to eliminate the zero 
bracket in the value added tax (VAT). However measures to 
broaden personal income tax and social security contributions 
were not adopted. In addition VAT reforms were delayed until 
fiscal pressures dominated in January 1993.
As to the intended goal of reducing the scope and scale of 
government activities, the authorities were even less ambitious 
and successful in comparison with their stated objectives. The 
share of general government expenditure was estimated at around 
60% of GDP in 1993/94, a higher share than at the beginning of 
the reform process in 1990 and also considerably higher than in 
most of the other transition economies in Central Europe.
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Steady progress was made by the National Bank of Hungary 
(NBH) in introducing, and increasingly relying on, indirect 
instruments to effect monetary policy, and the practice of 
providing automatic refinancing credits was gradually replaced 
with a system of auctions. In addition the cost of such credits 
was progressively increased, to induce banks to compete for 
deposits. Ceilings on household deposit rates were eliminated in 
1992. An interbank market, created in 1990, played an increasing 
role in supplying banks with marginal short term funding. The 
NBH also streamlined, reduced, and began paying interest on 
banks' mandatory reserves.
Parliament passed in December 1991 laws relating to both 
central and commercial banking, with one of the more important 
features of the first being an explicit statement concerning the 
NBH's legal independence; its primary responsibility for ensuring 
the value of the currency; and a stricter limit on the amount of 
direct financing of the state budget deficit to be phased in over a 
number of years.
It was also recognised by the government that higher priority 
needed to be given to improving both the financial integrity of the 
banking system, and to altering incentives such that banks would 
be willing to reduce operating spreads and resume lending to 
creditworthy customers.
In regard to capital market reforms the Budapest Stock Market 
was reopened after 40 years in 1990, making Hungary the first 
European transition economy to take such a step. A large number 
of supportive acts (such as the Act on Compensation, 
Accounting, Investment Funds and Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans) were implemented for the development of private capital 
markets. An interbank market for foreign exchange was created in 
1992, and a futures market for these assets was created the 
following year. Also an act in 1993 established a bank financed
Monetary policy and banking reforms
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deposit insurance fund, and the adoption in 1994 of a law 
allowing for the creation of private pension schemes further 
strengthened and began to broaden capital markets in Hungary.
Enterprise governance and structure
The government, determined to accelerate the transformation of 
state enterprise behaviour so as to be consistent with that of a 
market economy, hardened budget constraints, instituted a broad 
based privatisation plan, and further increased the autonomy 
granted to enterprise decision making from earlier periods. The 
government's privatisation plan combined a quick privatisation of 
some 10,000 small service establishments and, following the 
negative reaction to "spontaneous" privatisation, a case by case 
decision process concerning larger enterprises. In 1990 the 
government created the State Property Agency to privatise 
enterprises within its portfolio. The State Asset Management 
Company was formed in 1992, and was given control over 150 
enterprises in which the government intended to retain a 100 per 
cent, a majority or a significant minority interest.
Despite the growth of the private sector, which soon 
accounted for the majority of activity, problems still existed with 
a number of significant large loss making state owned enterprises. 
The tightening of budget constraints, combined with the sharp fall 
in external demand and change in production and trade patterns, 
exposed a large number of state owned enterprises as being 
fundamentally unsound. While most small and medium sized 
enterprises were forced to confront their situation through 
downsizing, bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings, a number of 
large enterprises, employing significant shares of the labour force, 
were able to continue operating while accumulating large losses.
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A number of significant reforms have taken place regarding labour 
issues in recent years. A system of centralised bargaining has been 
created, and institutions facilitating labour market mobility have 
emerged. However the labour market remains extremely inflexible, 
with little mobility between employment and unemployment, and 
within employment. In addition real wages have remained fairly 
rigid, especially when non wage compensation is taken into 
account.
To promote labour mobility and provide a social safety net, a 
number of institutions were created in the early 1990s. For 
example the Solidarity Fund was created in 1991 to provide 
unemployment compensation, and in 1992 a social assistance law 
was adopted which provided cash benefits and specific services 
to those who had either exhausted or were not eligible for 
unemployment compensation.
Poland
The economic situation in Poland deteriorated in the late 1980s, 
becoming particularly acute in 1989 with the emergence of 
hyperinflation and a large fiscal deficit. In the preceding years 
there had been several attempts to reform the economic system, to 
redress the inadequacies of Poland's centrally planned regime. 
However their limited nature appears, if anything, to have 
exacerbated the difficulties that were being experienced. It became 
increasingly clear that a more fundamental break in the economic 
regime was required, and in 1990 Poland embarked on a program 
of reform with a view to stabilising the economy and putting it on 
a transition path to a market economy. The Polish reform 
approach provides an excellent example of a shock therapy or 
"big bang" approach, indicative of an immediate change from a 
centralised to a market economy. In successive steps the new
Labour market reforms
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Polish government conducted the following reform measures from 
January 1990:
i. freed most prices from central control and eliminated most 
subsidies. Prices were allowed to increase with the objective 
of increasing supply, by providing an incentive for farmers 
and factories to produce more,
ii. the central government set itself the objective of balancing 
its budget to eliminate deficit spending, which had been a 
major contributor to the rapid increase in inflation in the 
economy in 1988 and 1989,
iii. in January 1990 the official and black market exchange rates 
were unified, and the exchange rate was devalued by some 
31.6% and fixed against the US dollar (9,500 zloty per US 
dollar). The devaluation, it was hoped, would encourage 
foreign investment and make domestic products competitive 
in world markets. In May 1991 the currency was further 
devalued (by 16.8% against the dollar and 14.4% against a 
basket of currencies) and the exchange rate was now pegged 
to a basket of currencies and not just the dollar. This 
reflected the increasing importance of Western European 
markets for domestically produced products. From October 
1991 the zloty was allowed to devalue on the basis of a 
preannounced crawl, and has steadily fallen in value ever 
since; and
iv. state enterprises were privatised. The Ministry of 
Ownership Change was created to oversee the process, and 
specialised institutions were set up to facilitate it. The State 
Enterprise Privatisation Law was adopted in July 1990, 
permitting four separate approaches to the privatisation of 
state properties:
• sales of entire firms to Polish or foreign investors,
• liquidation of firm assets and their sales to private 
investors,
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• free distribution of shares to investors,
• establishment of holding companies.
A number of problems regarding privatisation have become 
apparent, not the least of which has been in regard to the sale of 
large scale and obsolete state industrial enterprises. There was no 
idea as to the real value of such factories, hence there was no way 
of determining their fair market value. Additional problems lay in 
poor infrastructure such as for financial institutions, with the 
country only in the very elementary process of creating a 
commercial banking system and in the setting up of a stock 
exchange in Warsaw. The problem of unemployment necessitated, 
in practice, increased government support for large employers, 
such as the steel industry. In addition, state managers through 
corruption, ineptitude, or both, either sold or absconded with 
enterprise assets.
Privatisation, however, has had successes. Small scale retail 
and wholesale outlets were quickly privatised, and more than 1.2 
million new private companies were created in the 16 months 
after privatisation occurred. Privatisation has worked 
particularly well in the service sector, with banks and most 
department stores having been privatised. However the industrial 
base of the economy remains weak, and prospects for its recovery 
remain poor because of the difficulty of making such Polish 
industries as steel and shipbuilding competitive in world markets. 
However the slow progress in the privatisation of medium and 
large scale industrial enterprises has led to the adoption of an 
alternative approach. The government intends privatising such 
enterprises through a Mass Privatisation Program (MPP). The 
MPP is to be a voucher based privatisation scheme, in which as 
many as 600 state owned enterprises can choose to participate. 
The vouchers to be distributed could be used to purchase shares
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in investment funds, which would be freely traded on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange. The MPP was implemented in 1995.
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING THE TRANSITION 
PROCESS
This section identifies macroeconomic developments since 1989 in 
the three transition economies focused upon in this paper. A brief 
review of these for each economy in turn is now conducted.
The Czech Republic
Among the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, it 
is generally regarded that the Czech Republic has been the most 
successful, to the present, in moving to a market oriented 
economy. Macroeconomic developments strongly support this, 
and particularly in regard to the attainment of financial stability. 
Inflation has been significantly reduced (Table 3) and the balance 
of payments surpluses have made it possible for the country to 
accumulate substantial foreign exchange reserves (Table 9). This 
has reduced its reliance on balance of payments assistance and 
enabled it to repay early its entire debt to the International 
Monetary Fund.
The Czech Republic stands out from the other transition 
economies in a number of respects. Firstly, its unemployment rate 
has remained low and indeed below that of most countries in the 
EU (Table 4). Secondly fiscal difficulties arising from the 
transition process have been contained, with the government 
achieving a budget surplus in both 1993 and 1994 (Table 6). 
Thirdly, with the completion of the second wave of privatisation, 
some 80% of the assets in the economy are in private hands. 
Fourthly the credit rating of the country in international capital 
markets has continually improved, and is much higher than that
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of any other transition economy. Finally, and by no means least, 
the authorities have been very successful in maintaining support 
for the reforms from the population, primarily due to the 
popularity of the President Vaclav Havel and respect for the 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.
These achievements are even more noteworthy due to the 
particular difficulties faced by the country both at the outset and 
during the transition process. At the outset the country, whilst it 
was part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), was 
in a much weaker position than the other former centrally planned 
economies. Firstly the state dominated production, the market 
mechanism was virtually absent and trade was heavily oriented 
towards members of the former Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) (Table 1). In addition as the reform program 
was being launched the external environment deteriorated 
sharply, as trade with CMEA members shifted to world prices 
and convertible currencies, and economic adjustments or crises in 
other CMEA countries significantly reduced the CSFR's 
traditional export markets.
The former CSFR achieved early success in overcoming the 
cumulative effects of large scale liberalisation and a severe terms 
of trade shock associated with the dismantling of the CMEA 
trade and payments arrangements. However the CSFR did start 
with favourable macroeconomic conditions — low inflation, 
limited monetary overhang and a small external debt burden (as a 
per cent of GDP) (see Table 8 specifically for the case of the Czech 
Republic) — all of which contributed to this early success. But 
more importantly was the vigorous pursuit of stabilisation 
policies comprising a pegged exchange rate and restrictive fiscal, 
monetary and incomes policies.
The reform program itself was of the "big bang" type and 
included a number of structural measures, including: the 
liberalisation of prices and the exchange rate and trade systems;
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preparation for a rapid privatisation program; and a mutually 
reinforcing package of financial reforms. In the months preceding 
the introduction of the reform measures the external value of the 
koruna had been cut by nearly one half through several rounds of 
devaluation. Czech officials believed that for the sake of 
macroeconomic stability, and to limit the costs of the 
transformation, it was desirable to create two initial conditions — 
a depreciated exchange rate and a cut in real wages, both with the 
objective of maintaining international competitiveness.
The early progress in domestic and external stabilisation was 
threatened in the second half of 1992 and early 1993, due to 
uncertainties arising from the dissolution of the CSFR on 1 
January 1993 and the early termination of the Czech and Slovak 
monetary union in February 1993. However such difficulties were 
overcome by the new Czech Republic government's commitment 
to strong stabilisation policies.
Major success has been achieved by the Czech Republic in four 
key areas:
i. unemployment and output recovery,
ii. rebuilding the external sector,
iii. inflation reduction,
iv. privatisation and restructuring.
Unemployment and output recovery
A combination of reforms and external shocks contributed to a 
sharp decline in economic activity in the CSFR (see Table 2 
specifically for the Czech Republic), mainly focused in 1991 but 
also occurring in 1992. Economic recovery occurred in the second 
half of 1992, but was undermined by uncertainties relating to the 
dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Republic and a considerable 
deterioration in Czech-Slovak trade. After suffering a cumulative
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decline of about 20 per cent during 1991-93, real GDP increased 
by 2.6% in 1994. The Czech Republic's decline in activity was 
marginally higher than that of Poland's, to some extent reflecting 
its previously higher dependency on CMEA markets (Table 1) 
and the extra year it took to recover due to the dissolution of the 
Czech and Slovak federation. Developments in the output trend 
is largely dominated by industry, which accounts for some 35% of 
GDP. All branches of industry experienced a sizeable decline in 
1991 arising from economy wide factors, but during 1992-93 the 
impact was variable across sectors indicative of specific sector 
factors. In late 1993 the decline in output in industry bottomed 
out, recovering slowly in 1994 (Table 5).
Whilst the initial decline in output was very pronounced the 
decline in employment was much less so. During the period 1991- 
93, the cumulative fall in employment was only 9%. The 
development of small scale activity in industry and construction 
and rapid growth in trade and services (particularly tourism), 
provided a safety cushion against employment losses. Large 
industrial enterprises (ie. those employing 25 or more workers) 
held back on labour retrenchment, and were more inclined to cut 
work hours than the work force in the first year of the reform. 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the reform process, 
enterprises may have perceived that the output decline was 
temporary. Additionally, the pressure for downsizing was small, 
as the incomes policy contributed to a sharp decline in product 
unit labour costs. There was no catch up in labour shedding in 
1992-93, with output and employment declining in parallel.
Despite the decline in employment during the Czech 
transformation, it has not been matched by rising unemployment. 
After peaking at 4.4% in early 1992, the unemployment rate 
declined in the following 12 months and fluctuated between 2.5 
and 3.5% during 1993-94. Three factors have contributed to the 
low unemployment rate. Firstly many of those who lost jobs took
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up employment in the significantly underrecorded services sector, 
especially in rapidly expanding tourist related activities. 
Secondly, job opportunities have been available in neighbouring 
Germany and Austria. The German authorities, for example, have 
estimated that some 50,000 Czechs are legally employed in 
Germany, most of whom commute daily across the border into 
Bavaria under a special arrangement. But the most important 
factor that has kept unemployment down has been the 
withdrawal of a large number of workers of pensionable age from 
the labour force.
The government has also engaged in specific employment 
policies with the objective of keeping unemployment down, 
especially since 1992. The most important of which provide 
grants and subsidies for long term jobs, short term public works 
type jobs, retraining schemes and employment subsidies for high 
school and college graduates. In 1992, the number of people 
involved in such policy schemes exceeded 125,000.
Rebuilding the external sector
The progressive improvement in the external reserves position 
(Table 9), especially since the termination of the monetary union 
with Slovakia, has been impressive, and is indicative of strong 
export performance, growing receipts from tourism and large 
inflows of foreign capital.
The demise of the CMEA led to a major decline in exports to 
its former members, requiring a reorientation of Czech exports to 
the markets of Western Europe. This met with considerable 
success, with the share of Czech exports to the EU jumping from 
31% in 1990 to about 47% in 1994 (Table 10). Exports to 
Germany alone amounted to 31% of total exports. Greater access 
to EU markets in March 1992 arising from an Association 
Agreement and a further trade agreement with the European Free
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Trade Association (EFTA), were both influential in helping to 
direct exports away from the former CMEA countries toward the 
industrial economies of Western Europe. Exports to Western 
markets continued their strong growth in 1993 and 1994. 
However the Czech Republic has also been making inroads into 
new markets for products adversely affected by EU restrictions, 
such as iron and steel products (for example to China in 1993 
which absorbed 10% of the increase in exports). These overall 
gains have more than offset the steep decline in exports to 
Slovakia.
An important factor behind this successful reorientation of 
trade was the initial depreciation of the exchange rate at the 
beginning of the reform program, which created a substantial gain 
in competitiveness for Czech enterprises. Since this time 
competitiveness has been steadily eroded, but relative to its pre 
transition period it has still improved.
The scope for trade reorientation is much greater for the Czech 
Republic in comparison to its transition neighbours, due to its 
larger initial dependence on CMEA markets (Table 1). In 
addition, the structure of its commodity exports is more suited to 
taking advantage of its increased access to EU markets. 
Compared with Hungary and Poland, the share of agricultural 
products and mineral fuels (mainly coal) in Czech exports is 
small. With the exception of steel and some chemical products its 
access to EU markets for industrial products is largely 
unrestricted, while markets for agricultural products and coal are 
struggling with over capacity and strict regulations. The Czech 
Republic has also benefited from new marketing links associated 
with direct foreign investment, which has led to the diversification 
of its exports. Initially the rapid increase in Czech exports was 
concentrated on intermediate manufactured goods, but since 1993 
machinery and transport equipment, which were the main
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recipients of foreign direct investment, and miscellaneous 
manufactured goods have led the growth in exports.
Except for a brief period in late 1992 and early 1993, foreign 
medium and long term capital inflows have grown steadily. Net 
capital inflows amounted to an equivalent of about 12% of GDP 
in 1994, compared with 5% of GDP in the former CSFR in 1991. 
The nature of these inflows has changed significantly over the 
past four years. In 1991, the first year of financial stabilisation, 
capital inflows were largely in the form of official balance of 
payments support from multilateral organisations and foreign 
bond issues by the central bank. By 1992 as the success of 
stabilisation efforts became apparent, and the start of the 
privatisation process began, foreign private sector confidence in 
the Czech Republic was substantial, and was reflected in a major 
increase in foreign direct investment. From 1991 to 1992 net 
foreign direct investment almost doubled to $1 billion. However 
direct foreign investment slowed as the focus of the privatisation 
program shifted from direct sales to the distribution of vouchers, 
and also from weaker economic activity in Western Europe. The 
slowdown has, however, been more than offset by rapidly rising 
external borrowing by Czech enterprises. External borrowing by 
enterprises accounted for nearly 40% of net capital inflows in
1994, while foreign direct investment and portfolio investment 
each accounted for about one-fourth of the total. Since mid 1994 
local governments and domestic commercial banks have also 
turned to raising money in international capital markets.
Inflation reduction
After an unexpectedly large jump of about 40% in the first quarter 
of 1991, inflation declined rapidly to less than 1% a month by 
July and remained stable until August 1992. Price increases 
accelerated in the last four months of 1992 and culminated in a
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jump of the monthly rate of inflation to 8.5% in January 1993, 
following the introduction of a value added tax (VAT). After this, 
inflation came down rapidly and was contained at 20.80% for the 
12 month period ended December 1993 (Table 3).
The reduction of inflation was seen as being essential to the 
containment of inflationary expectations, and was to be achieved 
through tight financial policies. Inflation has tended to remain 
fairly sticky, however, arising from a substantial number of 
relative price changes that are still taking place as part of the 
transformation process. Price rigidities still persist in the case of 
house rents and charges by the public utilities. Full liberalisation 
of energy prices is likely to involve increases of 45-50 per cent for 
natural gas, 80-85 per cent for electricity and 15-100% for central 
heating depending upon the sort of fuel being used.
Privatisation and restructuring
The government has adopted a strategy of rapid privatisation, 
leaving the task of enterprise restructuring to their new private 
owners. Enterprise restructuring has been relatively slow, 
however, since the tasks involved for their new owners is massive 
both in scale and coverage, with existing managers postponing 
investment decisions and organisational changes. The legal 
framework for enforcing financial discipline and encouraging 
enterprise restructuring, was only put in place in April 1993. The 
delay in introducing the bankruptcy law was prompted by the 
government's desire to prevent bankruptcies from interfering with 
the privatisation process itself.
Privatisation of small enterprises was completed in 1992, 
whilst privatisation of large enterprises has been implemented in 
two waves involving both conventional sales to domestic and 
foreign investors as well as transfers of shares in enterprises to 
citizens through a voucher scheme. In both waves, the voucher
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scheme accounted for about one-third of the book value of total 
assets privatised. The first wave was concluded in May 1993, 
and the second wave effectively came to an end at mid November 
1994 with the completion of the last round of bidding in the 
voucher scheme. The shares were distributed to voucher holders in 
February 1995. With this an estimated 80% of assets in the 
economy are now in private hands. The new owners of the 
privatised enterprises as already indicated are expected to play 
the main role in restructuring and in the strengthening of corporate 
governance.
Hungary
Hungary entered the post-communist era in many respects in a 
relatively favourable position compared with its former CMEA 
partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Its more 
favourable conditions included a less distortionary price system, 
a more stable internal macroeconomic position at the outset of the 
transition process, a smaller share of trade that was conducted 
within the CMEA trading bloc (Table 1), a skilled workforce and 
close proximity to Western markets. On the other hand, the 
country was burdened by a very high level of external debt (Table 
8 ).
During the period of transition developments in the country's 
external accounts (Table 7) have provided the focal point for 
macroeconomic developments. The past five years or so can be 
divided into two broad periods. Firstly the period of external 
stabilisation during 1990-92 when the current account recorded 
small surpluses, access to external capital markets was re­
established, and inflation rates initially declined before increasing 
again. A second macroeconomic phase beginning in late 1992, but 
more apparent in 1993-94, saw a deterioration in the private 
savings-investment balance accompanied by high public sector
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dissaving, resulting in a marked deterioration in the current 
account. In addition progress towards a major reduction in 
inflation faltered (Table 3), employment fell sharply and officially 
reported output contracted further in 1993 before recovering 
somewhat in 1994 (Table 2).
Recent developments in Hungary's performance in terms of 
output and employment, inflation and external balances and debt 
are now discussed.
Output and employment performance
During the initial adjustment period the cumulative fall in official 
GDP, over the period 1990-93, was about 20%, which was 
broadly similar to that of the Czech Republic and Poland. For 
Hungary the sharp decline followed a decade of slow growth (an 
annual average growth rate of about 1.5%) despite a high 
investment to GDP ratio, which had been partly financed by 
external borrowing. The first strong growth in GDP occurred after 
seven years in 1994 at some 2.6% (Table 2). The earlier output 
decline was accompanied by a broadly similar lagged 
proportional decline in employment. Official unemployment rates 
increased rapidly to over 10% (Table 4), despite a sizeable part 
of the reduction in employment being followed by a reduction in 
the active labour force.
For the period 1990-93, the decline in output affected most 
sectors and all major demand categories. At the beginning it was 
particularly pronounced in industry (Table 5) and construction, 
while agricultural output fell sharply in 1992-93 as a result of 
severe droughts the effects of which were, further aggravated by 
uncertainties and initial inefficiencies related to the transfer of 
property claims in this sector. Smaller declines were recorded in 
the services sector. Gross investment declined from some 26% of 
GDP in 1989 to around 15% in 1992, and the external sector
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began to show a sharp deterioration in 1993. At this time a 
recovery in domestic demand contributed to a strong acceleration 
in imports while exports fell by some 12% in real terms, resulting 
in a noticeable widening of the external gap (Table 7). In 1994 the 
external balance remained largely unchanged and the recovery of 
GDP growth reflected a strong expansion of domestic demand, in 
particular form investment and private consumption, as 
household's disposable real income increased by over 3%.
The loss of trade with other CMEA countries presented a 
major disruption to the Hungarian economy, which eliminated 
existing productive structures and interrupted long standing 
business links that could only be replaced to a limited extent by 
trade with other markets in the short run. Even though the 
importance of CMEA trade disruptions may have been less in 
Hungary than in several other countries, with rouble trade 
accounting for about 42% of exports in 1988 (an additional 10% 
was conducted in convertible currencies with the then socialist 
countries), these disruptions did represent a major shock to the 
domestic economy. However if this had been the only major 
shock, external trade would have also recorded the sharpest 
contraction in its aftermath. Yet this did not happen and the 
share of exports in GDP remained fairly stable during the years 
1991-92.
The Hungarian government has been slow to reduce its 
dominant influence over the economy. The share of general 
government expenditure in GDP increased by almost 10 
percentage points in 1991-93 to over 60%. The large role of the 
state contributed to a heavy tax burden with disincentives for 
work and investment, and negative effects on overall production 
in the economy. The increased government expenditure was partly 
a result of increased, and inadequate targeting of, social 
expenditures related to declining economic activity. In addition to 
the level of state involvement, the widening borrowing requirement
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of the public sector (Table 6) is likely to have resulted in some 
crowding out of private credit with negative effects on 
investment.
The effect of uncertainty on investment may have slowed the 
transformation process initially as enterprises postponed 
investment activities until at least some of the uncertainties were 
resolved. However in view of its political stability and sizeable 
inflow of foreign direct investment (Table 13), this argument is 
probably less persuasive in Hungary for the years 1990-93 than in 
most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Other factors contributing to developments in GDP at this time 
included a redistribution of income towards labour and a 
resulting deterioration in enterprise profits, which had negative 
repercussions on investment and on the short term growth 
capacity of the economy. A sizeable rise in household saving rates 
at the beginning of the transformation process in 1991-92, may 
have weakened demand and output in this period. The situation 
changed dramatically in 1993 when the share of household saving 
in GDP fell by about 6 percentage points. There was a slow 
growth of credit to enterprises during this period, a reflection of 
risk assessment, which contributed to pricing many enterprises 
out of the credit market. On the credit supply side the financial 
weakness of the banking sector contributed to the slower credit 
expansion, with most of this being absorbed by the public sector. 
The recession in Western Europe, depression in other transforming 
countries, a prolonged drought with large output losses in the 
agricultural sector, UN sanctions against the neighbouring Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) also contributed to 
GDP developments at this time.
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Inflation rates accelerated in 1990-91, peaking in mid 1991 at 
around 40%. Whilst it has declined since it has shown 
considerable inertia, remaining at around 20% since early 1992. 
This inflation inertia to some extent reflects the gradual removal 
of subsidies which is being implemented over a number of years 
and is still continuing. While this policy of gradually eliminating 
subsidies may have limited the size of price increases in the short 
term, it is likely that the cost of this policy is the entrenchment of 
inflationary expectations over a longer period of time .
Increases in labour incomes provided a persistent cost push 
factor during this period. For example during 1990-93 real wages 
fell by only about 2%, and the decrease was more than recovered 
by the 3.5% rise in real wages in 1994.
The conduct of monetary policy also contributed to persistent 
inflation. Without well explained and well understood monetary 
targets, including that for the exchange rate, the economy lacked a 
clearly visible nominal anchor. Exchange rates were adjusted 
intermittently in an ad hoc fashion against a basket of currencies, 
with considerable uncertainty surrounding each devaluation and 
the exchange rate path. Domestic monetary conditions also 
lacked at times the necessary firmness and stability for reducing 
inflation. This was particularly apparent in 1992 and early 1993, 
when an easing of monetary conditions was accompanied by a 
sizeable sharp decline in market rates of interest.
The inability of monetary policy to address the inflation 
problem more decisively reflected to some extent insufficient 
support from other policy instruments, most notably that of fiscal 
policy. Public sector dissaving also contributed to the large 
external current account gap that increasingly required the 
attention of monetary policy instruments, at times at the expense 
of a lower inflation rate. The effectiveness of monetary policy was 
further hindered by the ease of availability of government
Inflation
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guaranteed and subsidised credits. This effectively protected a 
considerable segment of the market from the transmission 
mechanism of indirect monetary policy instruments through 
interest rates. These forms of credit amounted to about two thirds 
of the increase in credit to enterprises in 1994.
The external balance and foreign debt
Early on in the transition process the external accounts performed 
much better than anticipated. In terms of the saving-investment 
balance, this reflected a strong improvement in household saving 
in 1991-92 and weak investment demand. Hungary was also 
initially successful at containing imports even as trade was 
liberalised. Exports were directed towards the West, and the 
share of industrial countries in total exports increased from 40% 
in 1989 to almost 70% in 1992. By 1994 about 52% of total 
exports went to the EU with Germany accounting for 28% of total 
exports (Table 10).
The current account was in surplus over the period 1990-92 
and the net debt level decreased by $800 million to about 43% of 
GDP. Interestingly, Hungary attracted larger inflows of foreign 
direct investment than any other country in Central and Eastern 
Europe, averaging over $1 billion in this period (Table 13). In 
addition, the renewed access to international capital markets 
after 1990 enabled the central bank to borrow from abroad and 
increase its foreign exchange reserves (Table 9).
In 1993 and 1994, however, the current account deteriorated 
noticeably, being $3.5 and $3.9 billion respectively (each close to 
10% of GDP), with a sharp decline in exports but continued 
strong growth in imports. This development was due to a number 
of developments including a loss of cost competitiveness arising 
from comparatively large increases in labour costs during 1990- 
92, which left labour costs considerably above those in other
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transition economies. There was also a strong growth in domestic 
demand which stimulated imports but a recession in Western 
Europe which depressed exports. In addition the large dissavings 
of the state, with a fiscal deficit of 6.7% and 6% of GDP 
respectively in 1993 and 1994 (Table 6), weakened the 
macroeconomic saving-investment balance. On the supply side a 
drought related reduction in agricultural exports, repercussions 
from the 1992 bankruptcy law and the effects of UN sanctions on 
a neighbouring country also played a role in widening the external 
deficits.
The deterioration of the current account in 1993 and 1994 was 
offset by non debt and debt creating capital inflows. Foreign 
direct investment was particularly strong in 1993, exceeding $2 
billion, assisted by the partial privatisation of the 
telecommunication sector. In international capital markets 
enterprise and, especially, official borrowing increased strongly 
during this period, with the latter concentrated in the bond 
market. This was in part used to increase the foreign exchange 
reserves of the central bank, which increased to $6.8 billion at the 
end of 1993, with a further small increase to $6.9 billion in 1994.
The deterioration of the current account resulted in a further 
increase in foreign debt. Gross external debt increased to $27.7 
billion (69.5% of GDP) (Table 8) and the debt service ratio4 
increased precariously to 60.8% in 1994. Such developments 
indicated an urgent need to reduce the size of the current account 
deficit, and to bring about changes which would reduce the 
country's external indebtedness. Policy makers in Hungary have 
recently initiated measures to tackle this important issue.




Poland has received significant attention because of the recovery 
of growth of the economy since 1992, the first of the Central and 
Eastern European transition economies to achieve such an 
outcome. This followed a period in 1990 and 1991 which saw a 
collapse of economic activity Table 2), after the introduction of a 
comprehensive program for economic transformation. Since 
Poland embarked on this program earlier than the other countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, the recovery of output and 
Poland's experiences contain valuable lessons for other countries 
pursuing the road to a market economy.
Economic performance in 1990, the year in which the reform 
program was introduced, was mixed. Inflation reached the 
hyperinflationary level of 585% (Table 3), reflecting in part the 
initial choice of a fixed exchange rate at 9,500 zlotys to the US 
dollar. The general government fiscal balance recorded a surplus 
equivalent to 3.2% of GDP (Table 6) which was in part due to a 
one off increase in revenues arising from the taxation on nominal 
inventory valuation adjustments, taxation that contributed to the 
decapitalisation of the state enterprise sector. An incomes policy 
was set in place with a projected level of inflation that in the 
event turned out to be an underestimate, resulting in real wages 
falling sharply. This and the fiscal outcome resulted in a decline in 
domestic demand in 1990, which contributed to the sizeable 
surplus on current account (Table 7). These activity dampening 
developments contributed to the sharp decline in GDP growth in 
this year by some 11.6%.
It was anticipated that economic activity in 1991 would 
recover, but once again GDP declined by a further 7%. The most 
important factor contributing to this further decline was the 
collapse in trade amongst the CMEA partner countries, and the 
resulting deterioration in the terms of trade. There was also 
evidence of slow adjustment to the new economic realities with
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real wages increasing by 3%, reflecting in part the persistence of 
inappropriate incentive structures in the state enterprise sector. In 
addition a combination of reluctance on the part of enterprises to 
shed labour in the face of real wage increases and declining 
demand, contributed to a steep decline in enterprise profits. This 
in turn contributed to a decline in revenue to the government at a 
time when there was intense pressure to expand the social 
expenditure program. This was further compounded by the 
postponement of a value added tax to replace the turnover tax in 
this year, and the poor targeting of social expenditure programs.
Overall consumption gained at the expense of investment in 
1991, with an associated deterioration in Poland's current 
account balance, foreign exchange reserves (Table 9) and 
noticeable appreciation of the real exchange rate. These 
developments did not result in an acceleration of inflation. 
Although it still remained high, at 70%, this was significantly less 
than its rate in 1990.
The outlook as Poland entered 1992 was for a prolonged 
period of pronounced adjustment, and it was hoped that output 
in that year would fall no further. However the economy 
experienced a sharp turnaround in the early part of the year, with 
industrial production, in particular, showing a major recovery 
rising by 4.2% in 1992 (Table 5) after a cumulative decline of 42% 
during 1989-91. The recovery was broad based reflecting mainly 
favourable domestic supply factors, assisted, in part, by 
increased access to EU markets and gains in competitiveness 
from a further currency devaluation in February. The private 
sector played a key role in the recovery, with industrial 
production in the private sector increasing by 32% while in the 
state sector it declined by 5%. As a result the share of industrial 
output in private hands increased from a fourth in 1991 to almost 
a third in 1992. Industrial productivity was also considerably 
enhanced by the substantial shedding of employment. In addition
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within the state sector there was increasing evidence that 
enterprises were adjusting to the realities of hard budget 
constraints, implying a general strengthening of corporate 
governance. GDP increased by some 2.6% in this year.
Despite attempts to reduce it, and the buoyancy of the 
economy, the fiscal balance deteriorated further in 1992, largely 
reflecting the persistence of underlying structural problems in the 
budget and difficulties in the implementing structural reforms on 
both the revenue and expenditure side. The introduction of a 
comprehensive tax on personal incomes in January 1992 was a 
notable exception. The fiscal deficit for the year was equivalent to 
6.7% of GDP.
Whilst the trade balance improved, primarily due to a larger 
decline in merchandise imports relative to exports, the current 
account deteriorated further (to 3.7% of GDP), largely due to a 
sizeable increase in the deficit on net income flows.
Official projections for 1993 included a rise of 2% in real GDP. 
However the actual recovery in economic activity was much 
stronger, especially in the first half of the year. For example 
industrial production in mid 1993 was 8.5% higher in comparison 
to the equivalent period in the previous year, with employment in 
this sector stabilising. However the increase in demand in 1993 
outstripped that of supply, and the savings-investment balance 
deteriorated by some 4 percentage points of GDP. Progress in 
terms of consumer price inflation continued with inflation falling 
to 35% for the year.
The fiscal deficit for the year was equivalent to 2.9% of GDP, 
significantly less than the anticipated deficit of 5% of GDP. The 
improved result reflected buoyant revenues from the stronger than 
expected recovery of economic activity, and the successful 
introduction of a VAT to replace the system of turnover taxes. 
However the sizeable deterioration of the trade balance and the 
current account was of considerable concern, largely arising from
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a significant increase in imports with the further recovery of 
economic activity. Concerns about the deteriorating trade 
performance and Poland's international competitiveness, 
influenced the decision to devalue the zloty by a further 7.4% 
against a basket of currencies in August 1993. At the same time it 
was announced that the rate of crawl would be reduced from 
1.8% per month to 1.6% per month. Developments towards the 
end of 1993 and early 1994 indicated a reversal of the 
deterioration of the trade balance and a strengthened 
international reserve position, suggesting that the strong domestic 
excess demand pressures had significantly been reduced. 
Inflation, however, was still proving to be stubbornly high.
The 1990 transformation was introduced against a background 
of large and growing macroeconomic imbalances. Since this time 
the Polish economy has made substantial overall progress on its 
transition path to a market economy. Major success has been 
achieved in reducing inflation from the hyperinflationary levels in 
1989 and 1990, to 32% a year by 1994 and this is projected to 
fall further in the near future. Reflecting this development, 
confidence in the zloty is being restored and the country has 
begun to remonetise. The impact of comprehensive liberalisation 
has been to reduce queues apparent during the 1980s, and the 
range and quality of goods available has dramatically improved. 
The economy has also acquired a growing and dynamic private 
sector, accounting for some 50% of total output. In addition the 
financial performance of many state enterprises has greatly 
improved in advance of their privatisation. The liberalisation of 
Poland's trade regime has also resulted in an outward oriented 
economy that is looking to exports for growth. Finally, economic 
activity has been expanding in Poland over the past 4 years, 
making it the most rapidly growing transition economy in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
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PROSPECTS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU
Membership of the EU by the three economies under study, as 
well as that of Slovakia and Slovenia5, will be essentially a 
political rather than economic decision. Certainly few economic 
commentators in Western Europe would be serious enough to 
extend EU membership to these Central Europe countries at 
present on purely economic grounds. EU membership requires the 
fulfilment of three conditions:
i. applicants must be European,
ii. applicants must be market oriented, and
iii. applicants must be democratic.
All of these conditions have now largely been satisfied by the 
three economies under review. From the perspective of these 
countries priority must be given over the next few years to 
obtaining full membership of the EU, with any watering down of 
this likely to be unacceptable. Integration with Western Europe 
offers the prospect to them of a better way of life and a higher 
standard of living. Membership of the EU would provide them 
with the basis to achieve the kind of society which they wish to 
become. From the EU's perspective the costs and benefits of such 
membership, both economic and political, need careful scrutiny. 
Some of the key issues relating to this are now discussed.
A number of problems are likely to arise from the possible 
membership of the Central European economies, and these 
include:
5 These fellow Central European economies have also applied to join the EU. 
Although much smaller size than the three economies reviewed in this paper, 
populations of 5.4 and 2.0 million respectively, they have a similar GDP per 
capita, and were projected by the IMF to achieve real growth rates of GDP 
between 4-5% over the period 1994 to 1996.
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The economic imbalance between the EU and the Central 
European economies
The countries of Central Europe constitute a market of some 70 
million people. The demand for high quality produce from the 
west is very strong and would appear, therefore, to be an inviting 
new market for the west. However, Central Europe in comparison 
with Western Europe is still poor (Table 11), with living 
standards being approximately one-third of that of the EU 
average6. Central Europe itself admits that EU membership will 
have adverse consequences for some of its own industries, unable 
to compete with the west, but sees an expanded market as 
offsetting these adverse effects bringing benefits to domestic 
producers.
Common Agricultural Policy
One major problem standing in the way of Central European 
membership is the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This 
presently accounts for about half of the EU's budget. Unless this 
is radically overhauled and farmers exposed to world prices and 
markets, the cost of integrating Central Europe will be equivalent 
to one-third of existing farm spending according to calculations 
done by the EU in Brussels. Alternatively the larger farming states 
of Central Europe, particularly Poland, might have to be content 
with some watered down form of membership that keeps them 
out of the CAP. This is of concern to the Central Europeans who 
may find such "second class" membership unacceptable.
The contribution of agriculture in the EU and Central Europe is 
very lopsided. The exception to this is the Czech Republic which
6 The poorest country to join the EU to date has been that of Portugal, which 
had a standard of living approximately half of the then average of EU 
members.
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is much closer to EU averages (Table 12). In the EU only one 
person in 20 makes a living from the land, whilst in Poland 
(accounting for almost 60% of the population of Central Europe) 
one person in three lives in the countryside and mostly lives off it 
too. In Hungary nearly a third of the population live in the 
countryside, although only a tenth are formally employed in 
agriculture. Central Europe is very rural, with some 58% of its 
land area given over to farming compared with 43% in the EU. 
The sector accounts for 5.5% of Central Europe's regional GDP 
which is over twice its average share in the EU. Farming is 
particularly important in Poland where, unlike say Hungarian 
farmers who were collectivised, Polish peasants continue to 
cultivate small plots in the way that they always have. Polish 
farms are very small with an average size of 7 hectares, whilst the 
EU average is 16.
Like Hungary, Poland is a large exporter of food. But, unlike 
Hungary, it has become a net food importer since its transition to 
a market economy. One reason for this is that its food industry 
does not provide the quality Poles now expect. The small farms in 
Poland therefore cannot compete, and could only survive in the 
EU with an unacceptably high level of financial support. Major 
restructuring of the Polish economy would therefore be required. 
The problem for Poland would be compounded by the fact that 
its cities already have high levels of unemployment, higher than in 
most of Central Europe, and could not easily absorb a massive 
influx of people from the land. The EU in a recent review of the 
former eastern bloc's farm prospects, concluded that any future 
financial support should go into rural infrastructure, 
modernisation and putting together smallholdings to make viable 
farms. Certainly not into maintaining prices and incomes.
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Disharmony and instability
Instead of co-operating with each other, the countries of Central 
Europe compete and squabble amongst themselves. In addition 
there is alway the question of political and economic instability. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key measure of the perceived 
stability of an economy. The three Central European economies 
focused upon in this paper are short of cash and hence the role of 
FDI will be crucial to their development. However since 1990 the 
picture is quite variable (Table 13). Poland and the Czech 
Republic, for example, have proved to be very disappointing in 
this regard. The stable and market minded Czech Republic might 
have been expected to have been very attractive to foreign 
investors. Yet total foreign investment since 1990, at under $4 
billion, has been disappointing. This could be due to the fact that 
the government still controls much of basic industry. The low 
unemployment rate of below 5% suggests also that it has failed so 
far to undertake essential industrial restructuring. Poland 
similarly has performed disappointingly in this regard, and one 
reason suggested by German investors, the major single source of 
FDI to these countries, is the instability caused by the numerous 
changes of government. Since 1990 they have had a different 
government every year. Hungary shifted relatively easily to 
western ways in the 1990s, and has attracted nearly half the $18 
billion of FDI in Central Europe since 1989, although the pace of 
this is slowing down. However Hungary's recent intense financial 
plight (high budget deficits and perilously high foreign debt) has 
resulted in the imposition of a tight austerity program, which 
threatens economic growth and FDI. Membership of the EU could 
ease such concerns about instability which appear to exist, 
thereby encouraging further FDI for these three countries.
After the deliberations of the present 15 EU members as to 
their own future in Spring 1996, it would then be possible for 
serious negotiations to take place over the membership of the
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Central European economies. A number of encouraging
developments have recently taken place which would improve
their prospects.
• The economic performance of the three economies under 
review has been improving, with obvious problems still 
apparent. Poland's economy is the fastest growing in Europe, 
with 5% real growth of GDP anticipated for 1995 and 1996. 
Well above that in the EU itself. Already around 60% of GNP 
comes from the private sector. Poland has reently been 
compared with the Asian tiger countries by the German 
Deutsche Bank. Inflation is coming down but still remains too 
high, whilst unemployment at around 12% is the same as in 
France and much lower than in Spain. Problems with 
agriculture, in particular, keeps the country's standard of 
living down. The Czech Republic is now also experiencing 
steady growth of real GDP comparable with that in the EU, 
inflation is still well above the average in the EU but is still 
better than some members such as Greece, but unemployment 
is much below that of the EU. Hungary has been slow to 
recover from the initial sharp drop in output arising from the 
economic reforms, and inflation has remained stubbornly high 
as with unemployment. Its major difficulties remain in terms 
of the fiscal deficit, the current account deficit and its very 
high, per capita, foreign debt.
• The three countries have reoriented their trade towards the 
EU very successfully (Table 10) and would wish to expand 
this further, as well as attracting further FDI from EU 
members. Germany, in particular, has become a very 
important market for their exports, and is a major source of 
capital imports in particular. In the space of five years, well 
over half the region's trade is now conducted with Western 
Europe with invariably Germany as the leading partner. 
Germany is also the major source of FDI for the Central
38
European economies after the US and Italy, and, under the 
leadership of Chancellor Kohl, is also a major sponsor of 
Central European membership of the EU.
• The countries of Central Europe have a number of advantages 
including a cheap and well educated labour force, and a 
dynamism which has enabled them to redirect their trade so 
effectively to the west.
• So far in Central Europe this labour force has remained where 
it is, however further instability could create a wave of 
migration which would be difficult to control and Germany, 
in particular, would face the brunt of it. Hence a major, and 
influential, sponsor of Central European membership of the 
EU has been Germany. The desire to see stability and rising 
living standards in the countries on its eastern borders, is 
seen as being very important to them. Chancellor Kohl has 
made little secret of his desire to see membership of the EU 
by the Central European countries by the end of the decade. 
This time period, at the very least, will be required to enable 
these countries to achieve a level of development compatible 
with membership of the EU.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
This paper has conducted a review of the recent economic reforms 
and post reform macroeconomic performance of three Central 
European economies — Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
The reforms implemented clearly had a traumatic initial impact 
upon these countries, however there are positive indications that 
these economies are now in the recovery phase. The extent of this 
varies across the three countries. Poland's recent economic growth 
has been very strong and their is the anticipation that the Czech 
Republic is about to achieve the same, although Hungary's 
performance is still very weak. Major restructuring will still be
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required, particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
although significant progress in a number of areas has already 
been achieved. The remarkable reorietation of their trade towards 
the EU since the reforms and the continuing need for FDI to 
facilitate the restructuring process, suggests that these countries 
must look west. The development of their market oriented 
economies, desire for a higher standard of living and quality 
western goods by the populace, as well as desire for security and 
political independence, all indicate that their future lies with 
Western Europe and membership of the EU in particular.
These countries have a major sponsor for EU membership in 
the very influential form of Germany, by the year 2000 according 
to Chancellor Kohl, which would see the membership of these 
countries as achieving a number of their political and security 
goals. However it seems apparent that the EU which these 
countries wish to join is not necessarily that envisaged by the 
German authorities. The latter envisages a united economic and 
political Europe, including that of a European parliament, central 
bank and single currency, however the Central Europeans have a 
vision which is closer to that of the UK's, where Europe would be 
made up of independent nation states united mainly for economic 
rather than political ends. This would add another interesting 
dimension to the future evolution of the EU, should these 
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Table 2 Real GDP Growth (%)
Czech
Republic*** Hungary Poland EU
1989 4.50 0.70 0.20 3.50
1990 -0.40 -3.50 -11.60 3.00
1991 -15.90 -11.90 -7.00 1.10
1992 -8.50 -4.30 2.60 1.00
1993* -0.90 -2.30 3.80 -0.40
1994* 2.60 2.60 6.00 2.80
1995** 3.80 0.20 5.00 3.20
1996** 4.90 1.50 5.00 3.10
* Estimates 
** Projected
*** Until 1992 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (SCFR) 
Source: IMF, World Outlook, May 1995.
Table 3 Consumer Price Inflation (%)
Republic* H™ «a,y  Poland EU
1989 1.40 16.90 251.10 4.70
1990 10.80 29.00 585.80 5.40
1991 59.00 34.20 70.30 5.30
1992 11.00 23.00 43.00 4.50
1993 20.80 22.50 35.30 3.80
1994 10.00 18.80 32.20 3.10
1995 8.00 28.00 25.00 3.10
1996 7.00 17.00 12.00 2.80
* Until 1992 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) 
Source: IMF, World Outlook, May 1995.
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Table 4 Unemployment (% of Labour Force)
Czech
Republic Hungary Poland EU
1989 ____ 0.60 __ 8.50
1990 0.70 1.40 5.00 7.90
1991 4.10 7.50 10.00 8.50
1992 2.60 12.30 14.00 9.80
1993 3.50 12.50 16.50 11.00
1994 3.20 10.50 16.00 11.60
Source: IMF and EIU
Table 5 Industrial Production (1990=100)














** Figure for the forth quarter
*** Figure for the third quarter 
Source: IMF and Author's Calculations
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Table 6 Fiscal Balances (% of GDP)
Czech
Republic Hungary Poland EU***
1989 -2.70 -1.70 -7.30 -2.40
1990 0.10 0.50 3.20 -3.60
1991 -1.90 -2.10 -6.50 -4.40
1992 -3.60 -5.50 -6.70 -5.10
1993 0.80 -6.70 -2.90 -6.40
1994* 0.80 -6.00 -3.00 -5.80
1995** -0.10 -6.50 -3.30 -4.80
* Estimates 
** Forecasts
*** General Government Fiscal Balance 
Source: IMF
Table 7 Current Account ($ Billion, % of GDP)









































1989 _ __ -0.60 -1.90 -1.40 -1.70 -11.40
1990 -0.60 -1.90 0.30 1.20 3.10 5.00 -35.30
1991 1.70 7.00 0.40 0.90 -2.10 -2.70 -81.90
1992 -0.10 -0.40 0.30 0.90 -3.10 -3.70 -74.70
1993 0.10 0.30 -3.50 -9.60 -5.80 -6.80 10.90




Table 8 Gross External Debt ($ Billion, % of GDP)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
to CD tn
D C-, D a.
S D c' D c D.2 U o O 0 a*—<
«  o £ o B oa? t» c£
1989 __ __ 20.40 73.20 43.10 52.40
1990 5.90 18.70 21.30 64.60 49.40 79.30
1991 6.70 27.60 22.80 73.30 52.80 67.70
1992 6.90 24.60 21.90 63.40 48.50 57.50
1993 8.50 27.20 24.50 64.40 na na
1994 10.70 29.70 27.70 69.50 na na
Source: IMF
Table 9 Gross Reserves ($US Billion)
Czech
Republic* Hungary Poland
1989 2.20 1.30 2.30
1990 1.10 1.10 4.50
1991 3.20 3.90 3.60
1992 1.10 4.40 4.10
1993 3.80 6.80 4.10
1994 6.20 6.9** 5.80
* 1989-92 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
** Third quarter figure only















































1995, % of 
households
Germany 20,980 72t




* At PPP exchange rates + 1993
Sources: World Bank; ANR: German Federal Statistics Office
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Table 12 Agricultural Production/Employment
Agricultural Production 
as % of total GDP, 1993








as % of total employment, 1993









Table 13 Foreign Direct Investment, $bn, 1990-1995*
0 2 4 6 8 10
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